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THE IMPORTANCE OF STANDING:
THE NEED TO PRIORITIZE STANDING
REVIEW UNDER THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT OF 1969
Peter Bucklin*
INTRODUCTION
Standing under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
("NEPA")' is a confusing issue for courts to apply.2 Courts use
standing to determine who is an appropriate party to raise "com-
plaints in a judicial forum."3 The confusion stems from the fact
that under NEPA, there is no private right of review.4 Thus, public
Brooklyn Law School Class of 1995. The author wishes to thank Brooklyn
Law School Professors Jennifer L. Rosato, Roberta Karmel and George W.
Johnson III for their valuable assistance in the preparation of this Note.
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
2 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (stating that "the concept of
'Art. III standing' has not been defined with complete consistency in all of the
various cases decided by this Court .... "). The Court restated this view again
in Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990). See generally KENNETH C.
DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 3 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 16.1 at
1, 2 (3d ed. 1994) ("[S]tanding law suffers from inconsistency, unreliability, and
inordinate complexity .... As long as the Supreme Court continues to issue
complicated and inconsistent decisions on standing, confusion... will persist in
the circuit and district courts.").
3 RebeccaL. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L.
REV. 1513, 1549 (1991) ("The doctrine of standing provides [a court] with an
opportunity to decide which litigants are appropriate spokespersons for the airing
of complaints in a judicial forum.").
4 Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549, 551
(1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994) ("In drafting NEPA, however,
Congress did not create a private right of action. Accordingly, Public Citizen
must rest its claim for judicial review on the Administrative Procedure Act.").
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interest groups ("interest groups")5 must bring their NEPA
challenges under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA").6
Courts have intertwined APA review requirements with standing
considerations, placing the focus on the issue raised by the party
instead of whether the party is the proper one to raise the issue.7
The U.S. Supreme Court has been inconsistent in its discussions
and analyses of standing, failing to provide clear guidance on its
application under NEPA.8 Following the Lujan v National Wildlife
Federation9 decision, lower courts have been reviewing APA
requirements prior to standing considerations under NEPA
challenges. The Court needs to prioritize the standing and APA
review inquiry to reflect the logical order that these two compo-
nents appear to command. Courts should determine whether the
party is proper to raise the issue prior to examining the issue raised
by the party.
This Note's discussion is based on a series of legal challenges
brought by interest groups in Public Citizen v Office of the US.
Trade Representative.'° Public Citizen sought to compel the U.S.
Trade Representative ("OTR") to prepare Environmental Impact
5 This Note will focus on interest group challenges under NEPA because
interest groups predominantly raise such challenges.
6 5 U.S.C. §§ 702-704 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). These sections of the
Administrative Procedure Act contain the judicial review provisions.
7 See generally Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154 (1990) ("[B]efore
a federal court can consider the merits of a legal claim, the person seeking to
invoke the jurisdiction of the court must establish the requisite standing to sue.");
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) ("[T]he question of standing is
whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute
. ... "1).
' Unfortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court chose not to resolve these issues
by denying certiorari to Public Citizen in Public Citizen v. United States Trade
Representative, 5 F.3d 549 (1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994).
9 497 U.S. 871 (1990) [hereinafter Lujan I].
10 The two separate challenges by Public Citizen resulted in four opinions:
Public Citizen v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 782 F. Supp. 139 (D.
D.C.) [hereinafter PC I], aff'd, 970 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir. 1992) [hereinafter PC
IA]; Public Citizen v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 822 F. Supp. 21
(D. D.C. 1993) [hereinafter PC II], rev'dsub nom. Public Citizen v. U.S. Trade
Representative, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993) [hereinafter PC IIA], cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 685 (1994).
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Statements ("EIS")" for various trade agreements which were
being negotiated by the agency. Public Citizen brought two separate
court challenges 12 claiming informational injury from OTR's
failure to prepare an EIS.' 3 In both challenges, the circuit court
concluded that Public Citizen could not point to a final agency
action, required by the APA,' 4 which would trigger the alleged
harm.1
5
Public Citizen claimed informational injury to gain standing for
its NEPA challenge. 6 Interest groups claim a right to an EIS
based on their purposes of public education and advocacy.17 The
Court must confront whether informational injury is a sufficient
injury in fact to meet the Article III standing requirements. 8 To
establish an injury in fact, interest groups must demonstrate a
sufficient stake in the controversy to warrant a judicial resolution
of the problem.' 9 Unless the interest group can show a direct
relationship to a valid injury in fact in conjunction with an
informational injury, the group has no special rights to claim this
information. Instead, the information belongs to all members of the
" 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (1988); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1 (1992) ("The primary
purpose of an environmental impact statement... [is to] provide full and fair
discussion of significant environmental impacts. . .
12 See supra note 10.
13 See PC I, 782 F. Supp. at 141; PC II, 822 F. Supp. at 29 n.12; see also
Lawrence Gerschwer, Informational Standing Under NEPA: Justiciability and the
Environmental Decisionmaking Process, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 996, 1006 (1993).
14 5 U.S.C. § 704 (requiring that the agency action in question be final
agency action).
1" See PC IIA, 5 F.3d 549, 553 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
16 See supra note 13; see also Foundation on Economic Trends v. Lyng, 943
F.2d 79, 83-85 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (discussinghistory of informational injury claim
in D.C. Circuit).
17 See PC I, 782 F. Supp. at 141.
i See Foundation, 943 F.2d at 82 ("There is first the need to satisfy the
minimum requirements of Article III of the Constitution. To this end, a party
seeking judicial relief must show (1) an injury in fact, (2) fairly traceable to the
challenged action, and (3) likely to be redressed by a favorable decision." (citing
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
& State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)).
"9 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1972).
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general public.2" Courts have held that "a plaintiff raising only a
generally available grievance about government-claiming only
harm to his and every citizen's interest ... and seeking relief that
no more directly ... benefits him than it does the public at
large-does not state an Article III case or controversy."2 Infor-
mational injury is inherently a generalized grievance. 2
This Note will begin by briefly reviewing the Article III
standing requirements. In part II, this Note will discuss NEPA's
requirements and the APA review elements required to bring a
challenge under NEPA as well as analyzing both the current
standing inquiry applied by the courts and informational injury.
This Note will conclude in part III with a discussion of the four
opinions of the Public Citizen case.
I. ARTICLE III STANDING
Article III of the U.S. Constitution 3 requires the courts "to
identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the
judicial process" as actual cases and controversies.24 This is
known as the "doctrine of standing."25 There is only one question
under standing: who is eligible to obtain judicial review of a
20 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2144 (1992) [hereinafter
Lujan II]. The Court stated that when an individual seeks judicial review of an
agency action "it is not sufficient that [the individual] has merely a general
interest common to all members of the public." Id (citation omitted).
21 Id. at 2143.
22 See Foundation, 943 F.2d at 85 ("If one of NEPA's purposes is to provide
information to the public, any member of the public-anywhere-would seem
to be entitled to receive it.").
23 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 states: "The judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under ... the Laws of the United States, and
... to Controversies to which the United States shall be a party ......
24 Lujan II, 112 S. Ct. at 2136 (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149,
155); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984); Valley Forge Christian College
v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471,
475-76; see also Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen
Suits, "Injuries, " and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163 (1992) (discussing "a
capsule history of standing").
25 Lujan I, 112 S. Ct. at 2136.
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governmental action claimed to be causing harm.26 A party who
has established standing has demonstrated a sufficient stake in the
controversy to warrant judicial resolution of the issue raised before
the court."
A. General Requirements
The U.S. Supreme Court has adhered to a core component,
consisting of three elements, which establishes the "irreducible
constitutional minimum" of Article III standing.28 A party must
demonstrate that they personally suffered an injury in fact;29 the
injury must be "fairly traceable to the challenged action"; ° and
"is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision."'"
In addition, the Court has limited standing by requiring that a
party overcome three prudential principles.3 2 First, a party may
not assert a generalized grievance, "claiming only harm to his and
26 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 2, at § 16.1, 1; see Whitmore, 495 U.S. at
154-55; Allen, 468 U.S. at 750-51; Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 471 (citing
Liverpool S.S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885));
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731 (1972) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 204 (1962)).
27 See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,
97 (1968)); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975) (citing Baker, 369
U.S. at 204); Morton, 405 U.S. at 731; see also Foundation on Economic Trends
v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79, 82 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (quoting United States ex rel.
Chapman v. Federal Power Comm'n, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953)).
2 Lujan 11, 112 S. Ct. at 2136; see Allen, 468 U.S. at 751; Valley Forge,
454 U.S. at 472; see also Gerschwer, supra note 13, at 1009.
29 See Lujan II, 112 S. Ct. at 2136 (defining injury in fact as "an invasion
of a legally protected interest which is ... concrete and particularized" and the
injury must be "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical. . .. ')
(citations omitted). Further, the Court stated: "By particularized, we mean that
the injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way." Id. at 2136
n.1); Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472 (citing Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979)).
30 Lujan 11, 112 S. Ct. at 2136 (citing Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)); see Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155; Allen, 468
U.S. at 751; Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472.
"' Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472 (citing Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 41); see
Lujan II, 112 S. Ct. at 2136; Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155; Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
32 See Allen, 468 U.S. at 751; Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474-75.
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every citizen's interest. ' '33 These claims are "more appropriately
addressed in the representative branches., 34 Second, a party "must
assert his own legal rights and interests" and not those of a third
party35 and finally, the party's complaint must fall within the
"zone of interests" protected by the statute in question.36
Interest groups must satisfy both Article III and the prudential
principles to obtain standing. However, an interest group may claim
injuries to either the group's own interests or derivatively through
the interests of its members.37 In either circumstance, the interest
group must demonstrate that it has a direct stake in the outcome of
the controversy.38 The Court has stated that merely requesting a
declaration of legal rights does not satisfy Article III standing;
instead, a "real, earnest and vital controversy" must exist. 39
B. The Injury in Fact Test and Geographic Nexus
The key elements relating to this Note's discussion of interest
group challenges to agency actions in the environmental context are
the injury in fact requirement and the generalized grievance
principle. The injury in fact test helps to establish the direct and
33 Lujan I, 112 S. Ct. at 2143. The Court defined "generalized grievance,"
stating that a party "must show he has sustained or is immediately in danger of
sustaining a direct injury as the result of [the complained of] action and it is not
sufficient that he has merely a general interest [or is disagreeing with some
public policy that would be] common to all members of the public." Id. at 2144
(citing In exparte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937)).
14 Allen, 468 U.S. at 751; see Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475; Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474; see Allen, 468 U.S. at 751; Warth, 422
U.S. at 499.
36 See Allen, 468 U.S. at 751; Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475; Warth, 422
U.S. at 499.
17 See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333,
343 (1977).
38 United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
("SCRAP"), 412 U.S. 669, 686-87 (1973) ("The importance of demonstrating
that the party seeking review be himself among the injured is ... [what] gives
a litigant a direct stake in the controversy. .. ").
'9 Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 471 (quoting Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. v.
Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892)).
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personal stake in the outcome of a dispute necessary to demonstrate
the existence of a legal controversy.40 Conversely, when an
interest group fails to establish that it is directly harmed or fails to
show how a judicial resolution of this alleged harm will directly
benefit the group differently than it would benefit any other
member of the general public, then the group's complaint has
raised only a generalized grievance better suited for the political
branches.41
To assert a sufficient injury in fact, an interest group must
demonstrate that it has been or will be "perceptibly harmed by a
challenged agency action. 4 2 The injury must be to a cognizable
interest,43 and the interest group must show that it has personally
suffered this actual and concrete injury and that it is not merely
raising an abstract or conjectural claim.44 When an interest group
is not the "object of the action" it must allege "more than an injury
to a cognizable interest., 45 The group must demonstrate that its
members will be directly affected by the agency's action or non-
action by having more than a "special interest in the subject., 46
Demonstrating that the group's members would be injured
establishes "a direct stake in the controversy."47
40 See Lujan II, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2137-38 (1992); Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727, 733-38 (1972); see also Allen, 468 U.S. at 752; Valley Forge, 454
U.S. at 473; Warth, 422 U.S. at 498-99.
41 See Lujan 11, 112 S. Ct. at 2142-44; Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 473, 475;
Warth, 422 U.S. at 499-500; Morton, 405 U.S. at 732 n.3; see also Antonin
Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983) (discussing the distinction between
claims addressed to the courts and to the political branches).
42 SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 688-89.
43 Id. at 686-87; see Lujan I, 112 S. Ct. at 2137; Morton, 405 U.S. at 734.
44 Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990) (citing O'Shea v.
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974)); see Lujan II, 112 S. Ct. at 2136; Valley
Forge, 454 U.S. at 472 (quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441
U.S. 91, 99 (1979)).
4' Lujan II, 112 S. Ct. at 2137-38 (quoting Morton, 405 U.S. at 735).
46 Morton, 405 U.S. at 735.
47 SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 687; see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)
("A federal court's jurisdiction therefore can be invoked only when the plaintiff
himself has suffered 'some threatened or actual injury. . .. "' (quoting Linda R.
S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973))); see also City of Davis v. Coleman,
295
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Typically, an interest group claims harm to the recreational and
aesthetic interests of its members, which courts have held demon-
strates a cognizable interest for standing.48 In addition, courts
require the group to establish a geographic nexus.4 9 To demon-
strate this nexus, the group must show that the alleged aesthetic
harm will occur to a particular geographic area and that the group's
members have a relationship to this allegedly threatened area.5 °
"[A] plaintiff claiming injury from environmental damage must use
the area affected by the challenged activity and not an area roughly
'in the vicinity' of it."5 Under the Supreme Court's analysis, an
interest group claiming aesthetic injury from an alleged harm to a
wilderness area must show that it uses the whole area and not
simply a part thereof.52
521 F.2d 661, 670 (9th Cir. 1975) (quoting Morton, 405 U.S. at 734-35).
41 SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 686 ("'Aesthetic and environmental well-being, like
economic well-being, are important ingredients of the quality of life in our
society .... ."' (quoting Morton, 405 U.S. at 734)).
49 The Lujan H Court cited Methow Valley Citizens Council v. Regional
Forester, 833 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 490 U.S. 332
(1989) as an example of an interest group who had established a geographic
nexus and thus was concretely affected by the alleged harm. Lujan 11, 112 S. Ct.
at 2143 n.8.
5" See Lujan 11, 112 S. Ct. at 2139; SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 687-90; Morton,
405 U.S. at 735; Wilderness Soc'y v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 12-15 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
Coleman, 521 F.2d at 671; see also Lisa M. Bromberg, Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife: Where Does the Standing Issue Stand in Environmental Litigation?, 16
AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 761 (1993) (discussing geographic nexus in Lujan 11); Bill
J. Hays, Comment, Standing and Environmental Law: Judicial Policy and the
Impact ofLujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 39 U. KAN. L. REV. 997 (1991)
(discussing geographic nexus in general as well as in Lujan 1); Katherine B.
Steuer & Robin L. Juni, Note, Court Access for Environmental Plaintiffs:
Standing Doctrine in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 15 HARv. ENVTL.
L. REV. 187 (1991) (discussing geographic specificity in Lujan 1).
"' Lujan 11, 112 S. Ct. at 2139 (citing Lujan I, 497 U.S. 871, 887-89
(1990)).
52 The Lujan II court stated: "We did not so much as mention standing, for
the very good reason that the plaintiff [interest group] was a citizen's council for
the area in which the challenged [action] was to occur, so that its members
would obviously be concretely affected." Lujan 11, 112 S. Ct. at 2143 n.8. The
plaintiff interest group, therefore, established a geographic nexus by its members'
ongoing presence at the location of the alleged harm.
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In Sierra Club v Morton,53 an interest group claimed aesthetic
injury resulting from an agency's proposed actions regarding the
development of a wilderness area. The Court held that to establish
an injury in fact and to demonstrate that the interest group is
among the injured, the group must show that it actually uses the
threatened area. Otherwise, the Court noted, the alleged harm
would affect every citizen in the same manner. By showing that
those persons who actually use the threatened area would be
directly affected, the alleged harm would lessen "the aesthetic and
recreational values of [that] area," thus causing an injury.54 By
alleging harm to a geographic area unrelated to the group's
activities, the group has raised only a generalized grievance which
is inappropriate for judicial resolution..
C. Generalized Grievances
The Supreme Court has refused to adjudicate "abstract questions
of wide public significance,"" or "generalized grievances,"56 for
they are more appropriately addressed by the political branches.57
The Court seeks to avoid the federal courts becoming "merely
publicly funded forums for the ventilation of public grievances,"58
or parties attempting to "convert the judicial process into 'no more
than a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of con-
cerned bystanders."' 59
When the interest group in Sierra Club v Morton60 failed to
" 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
14 Id. at 734-35.
" Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (citation omitted).
56 id.
17 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) ("Standing doctrine embraces
... the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately
addressed in the representative branches."); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499
(1975) ("[W]hen the asserted harm is a 'generalized grievance' shared in
substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens, that harm alone
normally does not warrant exercise of jurisdiction.").
" Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 473.
'9 Id. (quoting United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973)).
60 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
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establish a geographic nexus, the Court viewed the group's claim
as predicated upon no more than a "mere [or special] interest in
[the] problem., 6' The Court noted that "if a special interest in this
subject were enough to entitle Sierra Club to commence this
litigation, there would appear to be no objective basis upon which
to disallow a suit by any other bona fide 'special interest' organiza-
tion however small or short-lived., 62
Thus, an interest group that raises a complaint, only demonstrat-
ing a mere or special interest in an environmental problem, is
voicing a political grievance about an agency's policy.63 As
Morton stated, the test for injury in fact serves to distinguish those
claims by interest groups that seek to "vindicate their value
preferences through the judicial process" from those who are
directly injured or affected by some agency action.' In other
61 Id. at 739.
62 Id. The Court continues this logic and notes that it would also not prevent
any individual citizen with a special interest from raising the same complaint. Id.
at 739-40.
63 [F]ederalj'udges-who have no constituency-have a duty to
respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do. The
responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy
choices and resolving the struggle between competing views
of the public interest are not judicial ones: "Our Constitution
vests such responsibilities in the political branches."
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
866 (1984) (quoting Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978));
see also Cornish F. Hitchcock et al., Developments in Judicial Review with
Emphasis on the Concepts of Standing and Deference to the Agency, 4 ADMIN.
L.J. 113, 127 (1990) ("Policy and politics come from the same root; they belong
together." (statement of Judge Stephen F. Williams)). Policy is meant to apply
to the public in a generalized similar manner. When a member of the general
public disagrees with a policy, either politically or ideologically, that person is
still in a common position with the general public. Because the policy applies to
the whole public in the same manner, the individual can only raise a generalized
grievance. "These sorts of ideological concerns are not supposed to give rise to
standing." Id. at 121 (statement of Edward W. Warren).
64 Morton, 405 U.S. at 740. The Court noted that "'scarcely any political
question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a
judicial question . . . . "' Id. at 740 n.16 (quoting ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA at 280 (1945)). However, "judicial review is effective
largely because it is not available simply at the behest of a partisan faction, but
298
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words, Sierra Club's complaint failed to establish a "direct stake in
the outcome" of the controversy. 65
To overcome merely being a generalized grievance and to
demonstrate a valid injury in fact, an interest group's complaint
must establish a geographic nexus to the alleged threatened area
that is causing the harm to the group's interests.66 Without
establishing this relationship, the group cannot demonstrate a
sufficient stake in the outcome of the claimed controversy to
warrant judicial resolution of the problem. 67 A generalized
grievance claim, the opposite of a valid injury in fact, fails to
distinguish the interest group from any other member of the public
who could claim the same harm and same benefits resulting from
judicial resolution of an alleged problem.68
II. STANDING UNDER NEPA
Environmental policymaking often results in contentious
choices. Interest groups, holding deeply felt views regarding what
is exercised only to remedy a particular, concrete injury." Id.
65 Morton, 405 U.S. at 740.
66 Lujan I, 497 U.S. 871, 887-89 (1990); Morton, 405 U.S. at 734-35.
67 [W]hen an alleged injury involves the use and enjoyment of
land, it is not enough that plaintiffs have a generalized
interest in preserving such use and enjoyment. Rather,
plaintiffs must allege that they or their members will suffer
particularized injury from being denied the use and enjoy-
ment of the land .... [T]he required showing involves the
specification of the land that the plaintiff intends to use that
the challenged action will affect. Otherwise, we cannot be
certain enough that the plaintiff will himself be among the
injured.
Wilderness Soc'y v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
68 We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a
generally available grievance about government-claiming
only harm to his and every citizen's interest in proper
application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief
that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does
the public at large--does not state an Article III case or
controversy.
Lujan II, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2143 (1992).
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constitutes environmental harm, often oppose these choices made
by governmental agencies.6 9 There is, however, no entitlement to
judicial resolution simply because a group holds beliefs or
maintains a special interest regarding environmental policies.7 °
The appropriate forum to raise challenges to policy choices is the
political branches, not the courts.7'
69 See generally Keith Bradsher, Court Ruling Lets Trade Agreement Move
to Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1993, at 1; cf John H. Cushman, Jr., Owl
Issue Tests Reliance on Consensus in Environmentalism, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6,
1994, at 28; Timothy Egan, Tight Logging Limit Set in Northwest, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 24, 1994, at A18. While these two articles do not address NEPA per se,
they do address the nature of a typical environmental policy dispute which is
often at the heart of NEPA challenges.
70 See Gerschwer, supra note 13, at 996. ("Decisions about the appropriate
level of protection of the environment and of the public health are inescapably
political decisions.").
In reviewing the policy area, however, the pressures for control of
agency power on the one hand, and for proper use of existing
institutions on the other hand, are dramatically opposed. One may
believe that the more important the policy decision, the greater the
need for a check outside the agency. But, for reasons of "comparative
expertise," increased judicial scrutiny seems less appropriate.
Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L.
REV. 363, 394 (1986).
71 See Scalia, supra note 41, at 892 ("The degree to which the courts become
converted into political forums depends not merely upon what issues they are
permitted to address, but also upon when and at whose instance they are
permitted to address them.").
The desire to separate law and politics has always been a central
aspiration of the American legal profession. From the time of its
earliest incarnation in postrevolutionary constitutional theory, politics
in American thought has usually represented power and will, the clash
of interests, and the subjectivity of values. Law, by contrast, has been
the only plausible claimant to the role of objectivity and political
neutrality. The legal profession, in turn, has had every reason to insist
on its own autonomy. If law is simply a product of power or will, any
special claims of the profession to determine the nature and scope of
legal development is undermined. The special power of the legal
profession in American society has always been grounded in some
theory of the distinctively objective and autonomous nature of law.
MORTON J. HORwiTZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860,
256-57 (1977).
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NEPA has either served its purpose well, promoting environ-
mental considerations in agency policymaking, or as a number of
academic commentators have suggested, failed to force agencies to
produce environmentally correct decisions.72 Some academic
commentators have concluded that the courts have misinterpreted
the public's role under NEPA.73 Commentators argue that interest
groups would monitor agencies and raise complaints whenever an
agency failed to consider the environment appropriately in its
decision making.74 However, interest groups have struggled to
72 Compare David C. Shilton, Is The Supreme Court Hostile to NEPA? Some
Possible Explanationsfor a 12-0 Record, 20 ENVTL. L. 551 (1990) with Nicholas
C. Yost, NEPA's Promise-Partially Fulfilled, 20 ENvTL. L. 533 (1990). See
generally M. Diane Barber, Bridging the Environmental Gap: The Application
of NEPA to the Mexico-UnitedStates Bilateral Trade Agreement, 5 TUL. ENVTL.
L.J. 429 (1992); Michael C. Blumm, Symposium on NEPA at Twenty: The Past,
Present and Future of the National Environmental Policy Act: Introduction: The
National Environmental Policy Act at Twenty: A Preface, 20 ENVTL. L. 447
(1990); David B. Lawrenz, Judicial Review under the National Environmental
Policy Act: What Remains After Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council?,
62 U. COLO. L. REv. 899 (1991). But see William L. Andreen, In Pursuit of
NEPA 's Promise: The Role of Executive Oversight in the Implementation of
Environmental Policy, 64 IND. L.J. 205 (1989).
" Some members of Congress also stated that their intention for NEPA was
to have the public enforce EIS compliance. See Yost, supra note 72, at 534-37.
74 This expectation for NEPA, that interest groups would monitor compli-
ance, can be traced to comments made by individual congressional members who
aired their personal goals for NEPA in the press. Senator Jackson stated: "We
expected Section 102 [the EIS requirements] ... to force the agencies to move
.... We did not anticipate that it would be private parties through the courts
that would force compliance. This is what has made it work." United States v.
SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 709 n.5 (1973) (quoting Jackson's comments from Cahn,
Can Federal Law Help Citizens Save Nature's Fragile Beauty?, CHRISTIAN Sci.
MONITOR, Feb. 28, 1973, at 12). In addition, Congressman Dingell stated: "The
success of the environmental impact statements is not so much that they were
used as we intended they should, but that citizens have been able to use the
process as a [way] to get into courts." SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 712 n.10 (quoting
Dingell's comments from Cahn, supra, at 12). While these members of Congress
may have hoped for different results under NEPA, one could assume that had
Congress as a whole wanted public participation for judicial review, it would
have included a private right of action in the statute.
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obtain judicial review of agencies' environmental decision making
under NEPA.75
A. NEPA's Statutory Requirements
NEPA appears to require only what its language states:
"Environmental amenities and values may be given appropriate
consideration in [the] decisionmaking [processes] along with
economic and technical considerations. "76 The statute requires
governmental agencies to include environmental considerations in
their policymaking decisions by producing an EIS.77 Congress
requires agencies to include an EIS "in every recommendation or
report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions"
that impacts the environment.78 Thus, the agency prepares an EIS
as an information tool, first for the government, and second for the
public.
79
71 See Shilton, supra note 72.
76 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1988); see Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983) ("Congress in enacting
NEPA, however, did not require agencies to elevate environmental concerns over
other appropriate considerations.").
77 Congress requires agencies to adopt policies that reflect the purposes and
declarations of NEPA. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332. The stated purpose is to promote
efforts to protect the environment and maintain the natural resources essential to
the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 4321. Further, Congress intended that all
practical means and measures should be used to promote and create conditions
to balance our country's social and economic needs with the environment. See
42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1988). See generally Kirsten Hughes, Environmental Quality:
National Environmental Policy Act, 21 ENVTL. L. 1159 (1991).
71 "All agencies of the Federal Government shall ... (C) include in every
recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed
statement by the responsible official on--(i) the environmental impact of the
proposed action ... ." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2). Congress also created the Council
on Environmental Quality ("CEQ") to promulgate regulations to guide agencies
preparing an EIS. See 42 U.S.C. § 4321; CEQ REGULATIONS, 40 C.F.R.
§§ 1500-1508 (1992).
7' Federal officials must consult with federal agencies for their comments
regarding the proposed environmental policy prior to the final preparation of an
EIS. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). The completed EIS will then be "made
available to the President, the Council on Environmental Quality and to the
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Courts have interpreted NEPA as imposing only a procedural
requirement on governmental agencies' decision making when they
consider the environment.80 Moreover, courts have conclusively
rejected all attempts at imposing or requiring any particular results
under NEPA when an EIS is prepared by an agency.8' NEPA is
construed narrowly by courts due to the broad language that
public .... Id.; see also Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 462 U.S. at 97 (stating
the twin aims of NEPA: first, the agency must "consider every significant aspect
of the environmental impact of a proposed action, [and second,] ... inform the
public that it has indeed considered environmental concerns in its decisionmaking
process").
CEQ regulations state that "[tlhe primary purpose of an [EIS] is to
serve as an action-forcing device to insure that the policies and goals
defined in [NEPA] are infused into the on-going programs and actions
of the Federal Government. . . ." An [EIS] is more than a disclosure
document. It shall be used by Federal officials in conjunction with
other relevant material to plan actions and make decisions.
Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 351 n.3 (1979) (quoting 40 C.F.R.
§ 1502.1 (1992)).
80 See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350
(1989) ("NEPA itself does not mandate particular results, but simply prescribes
the necessary process."); Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 462 U.S. at 96 ("The key
requirement of NEPA, however, is that the agency consider and disclose the
actual environmental effects in a manner that will ensure that the overall process
... brings those effects to bear on decisions to take particular actions that
significantly affect the environment."); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978) ("NEPA
does set forth significant substantive goals for the Nation, but its mandate to the
agencies is essentially procedural."); see also City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d
661, 671 (9th Cir. 1975) (stating that while an agency must solicit comments
from the public, "[i]t is the Federal agency, not environmental action groups...
which is required by NEPA to produce an EIS").
81 Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 371 (1989)
("NEPA does not work by mandating that agencies achieve particular substantive
environmental results."); Robertson, 490 U.S. at 353 ("NEPA's reliance [is] on
procedural mechanisms-as opposed to substantive, result-based standards .
• .."); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976) ("Neither ...
[NEPA] nor its legislative history contemplates that a court should substitute its
judgment for that of the agency as to the environmental consequences of its
actions."); Foundation on Economic Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79, 83 n.2 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) ("NEPA does not require that any particular substantive action be
taken in response to the environmental impact statement.").
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Congress used when drafting this statute.82 This language may
have inspired lofty goals, but it did not translate well into applica-
ble law.83
The problems confronting interest group challenges under
NEPA's statutory language are twofold. First, courts have been
unable to determine, from NEPA's language, a precise time that
interest groups can raise challenges when an EIS will not be made
available.84 Second, Congress did not include a private right of
action or citizen suit provision in NEPA. This has made interest
group challenges more difficult and has required judicial challenges
to be made through the general review provisions of the APA.85
82 See Shilton, supra note 72, at 552 (citing Strycker's Bay Neighborhood
Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980)). Shilton noted that "the
Court does not treat NEPA as an extraordinary statute under which the courts can
take an activist role in protecting the environment ... because no evidence
suggests that Congress intended NEPA to provide such a broad grant of power
to the courts." Id. at 558; cf Blumm, supra note 72, at 453 ("[A]n apparent
political consensus holds that amending NEPA to ensure that its goals are not
obscured by its procedures would be politically unwise. As a result, Congress has
acquiesced in the statute's substantive demise.").
83 While section 101 [of NEPA] sets out important policy goals
for the nation, there is no apparent way to translate these into
judicially manageable standards for resolving individual
controversies. Thus, the Act provides no "law to apply" to
determine the propriety of an agency's balancing of environ-
mental goals with other national policy objectives, and that
balancing must be considered unreviewable.
Shilton, supra note 72, at 565.
84 See 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b) (1992) ("NEPA procedures must insure that
environmental information is available to public officials and citizens before
decisions are made and before actions are taken."). But see Kleppe, 427 U.S. at
406 ("A court has no authority to... determine a point during the germination
process of a potential proposal at which an impact statement should be
prepared.").
85 PC I, 782 F. Supp. 139, 141 (D. D.C. 1992) ("Judicial review of an
agency's actions under NEPA is available only under the general review
provision of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 702-704
(1988)."); see Lujan I, 497 U.S. 871, 882 (1990).
STANDING UNDER NEPA
B. The APA Review Requirements
Because NEPA does not contain a private right of action, an
interest group raising a challenge under the statute "must rest its
claim for judicial review on the Administrative Procedure Act., 86
If an interest group can demonstrate that it has been legally harmed
by some agency action, it may seek injunctive relief under the
APA.87 In general, the "APA sets forth the procedures by which
federal agencies are accountable to the public and their actions
subject to review by the courts."88
Under section 702 of the APA89 there are two separate, yet
related requirements to Article III standing.9" First, a party
claiming harm "must identify some 'agency action' that affects
[them] in the specified fashion."'" Second, the party must demon-
strate that they are "adversely affected or aggrieved ... within the
meaning of the relevant statute. 9 2 Further, when review is sought
under the general review provisions, APA section 70493 requires
that the identified agency action must also be a final agency
action.94
Courts have held that the "adversely affected" element of
86 PC 11A, 5 F.3d 549, 551 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
87 Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 702).
88 Franklin v. Massachusetts, 112 S. Ct. 2767, 2773 (1992); see Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) ("Section 701
of the [APA], 5 U.S.C. § 701 ... provides that the action of 'each authority of
the Government' . . . is subject to judicial review except where there is a
statutory prohibition on review.... ."). But see Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99,
105 (1977) (stating that "the better view is that the APA is not to be interpreted
as an implied grant of subject-matter jurisdiction to review agency actions").
89 5 U.S.C. § 702 ("Right of review").
90 PC 1, 782 F. Supp. 139, 141 (D. D.C. 1992) (stating "two separate
requirements"); Foundation on Economic Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79, 83 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) (stating "two related requirements").
9' Lujan I, 497 U.S. 871, 882 (1990) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 702).
92 Id. at 883.
93 5 U.S.C. § 704 ("Actions reviewable").
94 Lujan 1, 497 U.S. at 882; see Franklin v. Massachusetts, 112 S. Ct. 2767,
2773 (1992).
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section 702 translates into the Article III injury in fact test.95 In
addition, the "aggrieved within the meaning of a relevant statute"
element of section 702 duplicates the prudential principle "zone of
interests" test.96 When an interest group raises a challenge under
these APA review provisions, courts should still determine whether
the group has alleged a "personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy., 97 The logical first question that courts should ask
under a NEPA challenge, is whether the plaintiff has suffered a
valid injury in fact. Unfortunately, courts have not followed this
inquiry in their current application of APA review under NEPA.
C. The Current Application of Standing Analysis Under NEPA
Interest groups raise two basic claims when attempting to obtain
standing under NEPA to challenge agency actions.9" First, when
an interest group raises a derivative challenge, the group alleges
that its members will suffer harm to their recreational and aesthetic
interests. The members' use and enjoyment of some area is harmed
by a proposed agency action and this harm is directly related to the
failure of the agency to prepare an EIS.99 Courts have consistently
held that aesthetic injury meets the adversely affected (injury in
fact) test, if the group can also establish a geographic nexus to the
9' See Lujan I, 497 U.S. at 883; United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 686
(1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732-33 (1972); Wilderness Soc'y
v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 11 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
96 See Lujan I, 497 U.S. at 883; SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 686; Morton, 405 U.S.
at 732-33; see also Gerschwer, supra note 13, at 1010 ("The zone of interests
test is not demanding: it is satisfied unless 'the plaintiffs interests are so
marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute.
.' (quoting Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987))).
97 Morton, 405 US. at 732 (citation omitted). Although, Sierra Club did not
raise a NEPA challenge, the group still sought standing for an environmental
complaint under the same general review provisions of the APA.
98 See PC I, 782 F. Supp. 139, 142 (D. D.C. 1992) (citing Lujan I, 497 U.S.
871 (1990)); Foundation on Economic Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79, 83-85 (D.C.
Cir. 1991).
99 See PC I, 782 F. Supp. at 142; Foundation, 943 F.2d at 83. Interest
groups typically want to prevent the proposed agency action and claim that if the"
agency would prepare an EIS for the proposal, then information produced in the
EIS would persuade the agency not to take the action.
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threatened area, and the aggrieved (zone of interests) test under the
APA.100
Under the second claim, an interest group alleges harm to its
own interests. The interest group claims a procedural right to the
information contained in the EIS.' When an EIS is withheld, the
group claims that the lack of information prevents the group from
pursuing its central purpose of educating the public or lobbying
Congress concerning the environment.'0 2 The group needs the
information in a timely manner to perform its role. 10 3 However,
the courts' acceptance of informational injury as a valid injury in
fact is not clear.
In some circumstances, a party raising a complaint under NEPA
does not have to meet all of Article III's standing requirements.
The Supreme Court has stated that a person living next door to a
proposed federal facility may assert a procedural right in the event
that the governing agency failed to prepare an EIS for the
proposal. °4 In this situation, given the neighboring proximity of
the threatened harm, the party would automatically establish a
geographic nexus. In addition, this party would have standing
"without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and
immediacy."'0 5 Thus, this party, who has established a concrete
interest because of their geographic nexus, must simply allege their
injury.10 6
'00 Lujan II, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2137 (1992) ("Purely aesthetic purposes is
undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose of standing."); Lujan I, 497 U.S. at
885-86 ("Recreationaluse and aesthetic enjoyment-are sufficiently relatedto the
purposes of [the interest group] ... [and] are among the sorts of interests [NEPA
was] specifically designed to protect."); SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 686 (citing Morton,
405 U.S. at 734).
'' See PC 1, 782 F. Supp. at 142; Foundation, 943 F.2d at 83-84.
'02 See PC I, 782 F. Supp. at 141-42; Foundation, 943 F.2d at 83-85.
103 See PC I, 782 F. Supp. at 141.
104 Lujan II, 112 S. Ct. at 2143.
105 Id. at 2143 n.7.
106 See id The problem for interest groups is that they are seldom next door
neighbors to proposed federal facilities or to wilderness areas where an agency
has proposed some allegedly harmful action. The Court's reasoning is as follows:
a person or group that resides at the opposite end of the country from the
proposed federal facility would not have concrete interests affected to establish
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A federal court cannot "consider the merits of a legal claim,"
unless the party seeking review has established standing.10 7 In
other words, whether the party is proper or has standing to raise an
asserted challenge is "the threshold question in every federal
case."'0 8 Without answering this question, the court has not
established that it has the power to hear a particular case.'0 9 The
Supreme Court's current analysis under NEPA, however, has first
focused on the existence of a final agency action. The "core
question" has become: "Whether the agency has completed its
decisionmaking process, and whether the result of that process is
one that will directly affect the parties.""
D. The Source of the Inverted Standing Inquiry Under NEPA
Although the tests posed by Article III standing and the APA
review are analytically distinct questions and should be reviewed
as such, courts have merged the two inquiries."' Courts are
looking at whether the plaintiff is personally injured and at whether
the injury was caused by a final agency action together. In effect
though, the existence of a final agency action dominates this
merged inquiry to the detriment of determining first whether the
party actually has a valid injury in fact.
standing to challenge the agency's failure to prepare an EIS. Interest groups in
this position would not be able to establish a geographic nexus between the
threatened area, which would be on the other side of the country, and the alleged
harm to the group's interests. More often than not, groups claim harm to
aesthetic interests resulting from dispersed areas. Under the Court's analysis, in
this circumstance it is unlikely that a group could demonstrate a geographic
nexus.
107 Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154-55 (1990); see Lujan II, 112
S. Ct. at 2144.
10' Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975); see Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S.
464, 471 (1982) ("[T]his Court has always required that a litigant have 'standing'
to challenge the action sought to be adjudicated in the lawsuit.").
109 Warth, 422 U.S. at 498.
l"O Franklin v. Massachusetts, 112 S. Ct. 2767, 2773 (1992).
".. Wilderness Soc'y v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 11 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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In Foundation on Economic Trends v Lyng,"2 the D.C.
Circuit court merged Article III standing with APA review. The
court, in effect, elevated its review of determining the existence of
a final agency action over examining whether the interest group
was the proper party to challenge the agency action in the first
place." 3 The court was looking at the source of the injury before
determining if the injury itself was valid for judicial resolution. The
culprit for the Foundation court's merger and reversal of the
standing inquiry is the Supreme Court's decision in Lujan P"14
In Lujan I,5 the interest group, National Wildlife Federation
("NWF"), claimed that a government program, reclassifying public
lands to make them available for mining activities, would destroy
the lands natural beauty, thus causing aesthetic injury."6 The
group also claimed informational injury resulting from the lack of
an EIS." 7 After examining NWF's claims, the Court found only
a "bare allegation of injury."".. NWF's claims failed on two
grounds. The Court held that the group did not establish a
geographic nexus between NWF's members and the alleged
threatened area causing NWF's claimed aesthetic harm." 9 In
addition, the Court refused to review a complaint that was aimed
at an entire agency's program. 2 °
The programmatic challenge raised by NWF appears to be a
variant of a generalized grievance claim. The Court stated that the
112 943 F.2d 79 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
11 The Foundation court recognized this fact stating, "this tends to merge
standing under the APA with the merits of a plaintiff's NEPA claim. But such
a result is not an uncommon consequence of applying the standing test for APA
review . . . ." Id. at 85-86.
114 Id. The court states: "The issues thus presented by the Foundation's claim
of standing are, however, unnecessary to decide in view of the Supreme Court's
decision in [Lujan I, 497 U.S. 871 (1990)]." Id. at 85.
11 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
116 Id. at 875-79. The National Wildlife Federation ("NWF") complained that
the agency violated NEPA by failing to prepare an EIS. Id. at 879.
..7 Id. at 898.
8 Id. at 887.
19 Id (citing the district court record, National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford,
669 F. Supp. 327, 331 (D. D.C. 1988)).
120 Id. at 891.
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interest group could not "seek wholesale improvement of this
program by court decree, [but in] ... the halls of Congress, where
programmatic improvements are normally made.'' This pro-
grammatic claim, combined with NWF's failure to establish a
geographic nexus to the alleged harm, implicates the group's
complaint of informational injury as merely a generalized griev-
ance. In other words, NWF's complaint seems to be based only on
a mere interest in resolving a policy dispute regarding the environ-
ment.
While the Court initially stated that the issue was whether the
interest group was a proper party to challenge the agency ac-
tion, 12 its conclusion did not rest on any aspect of Article III
standing. Even though the Court acknowledged that the complaint
failed the injury in fact test and in effect only raised a generalized
grievance, 23 the Court instead focused on the lack of an identifi-
able final agency action. Hence, Lujan I delivered a message to
future courts that the need to identify a final agency action trumps
the Article III standing inquiry. This new inquiry, however, does
not provide an answer to whether informational injury is a valid
harm under Article III to confer standing.
E. Informational Injury is Inherently a Generalized Grievance
An interest group that claims informational injury without
demonstrating a relational nexus between the group's harm and the
source of this threatened harm is relying on a mere special interest
to obtain this information. In other words, the group wants
information to lobby and educate about a specific alleged harm.
However, the real source of the injury is not the lack of informa-
tion to the group. Instead, the injury is the alleged harm to the
particular area or program that the group is seeking to prevent.
Therefore, the interest group must demonstrate a nexus to the real
source of the harm, the threatened area or program, in order to
establish a valid injury in fact.
121 Id. at 891.
122 Id. at 875.
123 Id. at 890.
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In the Foundation case,"' the interest group claimed informa-
tional injury relating to an alleged harmful germplasm program
conducted by a government agency. 25 The group wanted the
agency to prepare an EIS, believing that this information would
result in the program's rejection. 26 But, the group's only rela-
tionship to this particular program was its special interest in
preventing a perceived environmental harm and its desire for
information to publicize the alleged harm. 27 Yet, the interest
group claimed informational injury as a direct harm to the group by
only alleging that its purposes were injured.
Informational injury claims without a relational nexus are really
a variant on the special interest standing claim which the Morton
Court rejected. 21 If the Foundation court had applied the injury
in fact test as the Supreme Court has required under Article III, the
interest group here would not have standing because its informa-
tional injury claim was nothing more than a generalized griev-
ance. 
29
The Foundation court stated that there was a "logical appeal"
in recognizing informational injury as valid to grant standing in
terms of the Article III requirements. 30 However, the court
recognized a drawback in this reasoning: To give in to this logical
appeal "would potentially eliminate any standing requirement in
NEPA cases .. ." involving informational injury.' The
Foundation court discussed the history of informational standing in
the D.C. Circuit and noted that despite general statements by courts
favoring the validity of this injury, no prior decision had granted
124 943 F.2d 79 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
125 Id. at 80-82.
126 Id. at 83.
127 Id. at 85.
128 See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); supra notes 60-68 and
accompanying text.
129 See supra notes 55-68 and accompanying text.
130 Foundation, 943 F.2d at 84 ("[I]f the injury in fact is the lack of
information about the environmental impact of agency action, it follows that the
injury is caused by the agency's failure to develop such information in an impact
statement and can be redressed by ordering the agency to prepare one.").
131 id.
JOURNAL OF LA W AND POLICY
standing to an interest group solely on the basis of informational
injury.132
The drawback underlying the validity of informational injury is
that "[i]f one of NEPA's purposes is to provide information to the
public, any member of the public-anywhere-would seem to be
entitled to receive it."' 3 3 In fact, given the nature of the agencies'
processes, the potential for an informational injury would exist all
the time, or "whenever federal agencies are not creating informa-
tion a member of the public would like to have."' 34 Under this
scenario, any group with a special interest in agency environmental
policymaking could simply claim standing whenever an EIS does
not exist or an agency is not producing the type of information a
group wants. However, special interest claims are really generalized
claims that any member of the public could raise.
These special interest claims or generalized grievances do not
distinguish how the plaintiff would directly benefit from a judicial
resolution any differently from any or every other member of the
public. 135 The Foundation court's analysis of informational injury
leads to this same conclusion. 136 The harm alleged by the interest
group in Foundation could conceivably threaten any member of the
public similarly. Further, any interested member of the public could
also benefit similarly from the information sought by the interest
group. The interest group could not distinguish its injury from
132 Id. at 83-85. The Foundation court noted that informational injury first
appeared in a footnote in Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Info., Inc. v. Atomic Energy
Comm'n ("SIP1'), 481 F.2d 1079, 1086-87 n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Id. at 83. The
Foundation court found that the SIPI court's statement concerning informational
injury was "inaccurately described as a holding" in a subsequent case, Sierra
Club v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 895, 900 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 442 U.S. 347 (1979). Id. However, the Foundation court noted that in
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 606 F.2d
1031, 1042 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1979), the SIPI court's informational injury statement
was viewed with caution. Id. at 84. See also Gerschwer, supra note 13, at 1012-
18 (discussing precedents for the validity of informational injury).
133 Foundation, 943 F.2d at 85.
134 Id.
131 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739-40 (1972).
136 Foundation, 943 F.2d at 85.
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potential harm suffered by the general public as a whole. 37
By its nature, informational injury, claimed alone, is inherently
a generalized grievance. Nonetheless, the Foundation court
concluded that to establish standing under a claim of informational
injury, an interest group must demonstrate a final agency action in
conjunction with the informational claim. 38 This holding implies
that an informational injury with an identifiable agency action
would be sufficient to confer standing on an interest group. This
would be so, even though the group's claim failed to establish a
direct stake in the outcome of the controversy under the injury in
fact test because the claim was inherently a generalized griev-
ance. 1
39
The Foundation court's discussion of prior informational injury
decisions explained how these claims have been misunderstood and
inadequately addressed. 140 But, the Foundation court continued
this trend. The Foundation court relied on Lujan 141 for its
determination that the missing element to confer informational
standing was identifying a final agency action. 42 The Lujan I
Court, rather then analyzing the nature of the informational claim,
simply assumed the injury might be valid. 143 The Court then
rejected this claim because the interest group failed "to identify any
particular agency action" that triggered the alleged injury. 144
137 Id; see United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-80 (1974).
138 Foundation, 943 F.2d at 86-87.
139 See supra notes 55-68 and accompanying text.
140 Foundation, 943 F.2d at 83-84.
"' 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
142 Foundation, 943 F.2d at 85.
143 Even assuming that the affidavit set forth "specific facts,"
... adequate to show injury to respondent through the
deprivation of information; and even assuming that providing
information to organizations such as respondent was one of
the objectives of the statutes allegedly violated [NEPA], so
that respondent [was] "aggrieved within the meaning" of
those statues; nonetheless, the ... affidavit fails to identify
any particular "agency action" that was the source of these
injuries.
Lujan I, 497 U.S. 871, 898-99 (1990) (emphases added).
144 Id. at 899.
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Under a NEPA challenge, the key elements should be whether
the plaintiff has asserted a sufficient injury in fact or whether the
interest group has only raised a generalized grievance. The fact that
a plaintiff with a NEPA claim must actually establish standing
under the APA review provisions should not preempt the Article III
standing inquiry. As the Supreme Court has stated: "[O]f one thing
we may be sure: Those who do not possess [Article III] standing
may not litigate as suitors in the courts of the United States." '45
However, in Public Citizen, the court followed the new Lujan I
inquiry, seeking final agency action over the more logical threshold
inquiry, determining a valid injury in fact.'46
III. THE PUBLIC CITIZEN CASE'4 7
The interest group, Public Citizen, brought two separate
challenges under NEPA. Underlying both challenges was Public
Citizen's complaint to compel the government agency involved, the
Office of the United States Trade Representative ("OTR"), to
prepare an EIS for trade agreements. Because the first challenge
failed due to the lack of final agency action,'48 Public Citizen
returned later with a second challenge. This second challenge also
failed because Public Citizen could not point to an identifiable final
agency action that would "directly affect Public Citizen's mem-
bers."'4 9
"45 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans for Separation of Church
& State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475-76 (1982).
146 PC IIA, 5 F.3d 549, 553 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The court concluded that the
trade agreement was not 'final agency action' under the APA, and reversed the
decision of the district court and expressed no view on the government's standing
contentions. Id. at 550; PC IA, 970 F.2d 916, 917 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("We do not
reach standing, but affirm because plaintiffs have failed to identify any final
agency action judicially reviewable within the meaning of [the APA].").
147 See supra note 10.
148 PC IA, 970 F.2d at 917.
149 PC 11A, 5 F.3d at 553.
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A. The D.C. District Court Opinion ("PC I")"50
In the first challenge before the PC I district court, Public
Citizen alleged that "political pressure and potential challenges to
U.S. laws as trade barriers are among the factors which might
weaken various state laws protecting ... the environment.''.
Public Citizen claimed that this alleged potential harm would have
an injurious effect on its members who lived in various areas of the
country.'52 However, the court concluded that these allegations of
harm were "no more precise then those held inadequate in
NWF.', 153 But, the court followed the precedent set by both the
Lujan 114 and Foundation' decisions and denied standing
based on the group's failure to identify an agency action to
accompany its informational injury claim.156
The PC I district court began its inquiry by looking at the
requirements of Article III standing and noted that the APA review
added two separate requirements. 57 Citing Foundation,' the
district court noted that an informational injury claim by itself
appeared to be the same as the mere interest claim held by the
Morton Court to be "inadequate for standing purposes." ''  Also,
the court acknowledged that Public Citizen's claim here was similar
to NWF's claim seeking review of an entire agency's program,
which the Lujan I Court had rejected. 60
However, even with all these seemingly failing aspects of the
injury in fact test, the court still denied standing to Public Citizen
150 PC I, 782 F. Supp. 139 (D. D.C.), aft'd, PC IA, 970 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir.
1992).
5 ' PC 1, 782 F. Supp. at 142 (emphases added).
152 id,
153 Id.
114 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
15' Foundation on Economic Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
156 PC , 782 F. Supp. at 143.
157 Id. at 141.
15" Foundation, 943 F.2d at 84 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727, 739 (1972)).
"9 PC L 782 F. Supp. at 143.
160 Id. at 142 (citing Lujan I, 497 U.S. 871, 890 n.2 (1990)).
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under the agency action component of APA review. Further,
despite the indications that Public Citizen would not be a proper
party to raise this issue in the first place, the court also stated that
the interest group only did "not have standing to bring [its]
challenge at this time.'' This statement implies that if Public
Citizen could identify an agency action, then it would become a
proper party to raise this complaint.
B. The D.C. Circuit Court Opinion ("PC L4A )162
On appeal before the PC A circuit court, Public Citizen alleged
that "the agreements would have various potentially adverse
environmental effects."' 163 Public citizen also claimed that there
was "the chance of increased pollution on the U.S.-Mexico border
due to . . . treaty inspired faster economic development."'" The
group did point to a specific law that it claimed would be a source
of harm if changed, 165 but did not show how this particular law
related directly to its members.
The PC LA circuit court apparently viewed the Lujan i166 and
Foundation167 decisions as requiring a complete separation of
Article III standing and APA review. In addition, the PC LA circuit
court elevated the APA review final agency action component over
the Article III requirements. The court stated: "We do not reach
standing, [at all] but affirm [the district court] because [Public
Citizen has] failed to identify any 'final agency action' [that was]
judicially reviewable .... , 168 The circuit court was concerned
with the potential of unnecessary interference in the agency's "day-
to-day decisionmaking process."'1 69 Without reviewing the group's
standing, the PC IA court dismissed the case by finding that the
161 PC 1, 782 F. Supp. at 140 (emphasis added).
162 PC IA, 970 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
163 PC IA, 970 F.2d at 918 (emphasis added).
'64 Id. (emphasis added).
165 Id.
166 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
167 Foundation on Economic Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
168 PC IA, 970 F.2d at 917.
169 Id. at 920 (citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 406 n.15 (1976)).
316
STANDING UNDER NEPA
timing of the challenge was wrong.
The circuit court noted that, "NEPA itself ... specifically
identifies the time when an agency's action is sufficiently concrete
to trigger the EIS requirement."' 7 ° Refusal to prepare an EIS by
the agency alone was not enough to identify an agency action. 7'
The court's analysis failed to, address whether Public Citizen was
even a proper party; nor did the court seem concerned with the
implicitly generalized nature of Public Citizen's claims.
C. The D.C. District Court Opinion ("PC JJ)172
In this second challenge, Public Citizen again alleged similar
claims of harm. This harm would result from changes to various
laws dictated by the trade agreements. These changes, according to
the group, would "result in environmental changes to certain
geographical areas, such as the area on the border between the
United States and Mexico. '"173 Furthermore, the group alleged that
from these potential changes the court could determine whether the
trade agreement was "likely to harm" the interest group. 74
The PC II district court concluded from the group's allegations
that the agreements "may very likely result in environmental injuries
to certain members of the [interest group].' Despite the ab-
sence of a geographic nexus between the threatened areas and the
group's members, the court concluded these allegations were
sufficient to "establish standing under the NEPA.' 76 The court
also found that Public Citizen had identified a final agency action
that triggered the alleged harm.177
170 Id. at 918.
171 id.
172 PC II, 822 F. Supp. 21 (D. D.C. 1993), rev'd, PC IIA, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C.
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994).
173 PC II, 822 F. Supp. at 27.
174 Id.
171 Id. at 28 (emphasis added).
176 Id. at 27.
177 Id. at 23-26.
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D. The D. C. Circuit Court Opinion ("PC IIA ,)178
The PC IIA circuit court reversed the district court's decision
and again denied standing to Public Citizen.'79 The court stated:
"The central question in this appeal is whether Public Citizen has
identified some agency action that is final upon which to base APA
review."' 80 Public Citizen again failed to identify the final agency
action triggering the harm.' In the circuit court's view, absent
final agency action, there was no further need to review Public
Citizen's standing. 8 2 Thus, the PC HA court did not consider
whether Public Citizen had Article III standing to raise this claim.
The PC IIA circuit court pointed out that the solution to this
issue was to let Congress simply refuse to consider the trade
agreements until an EIS is prepared.'83 Judge Randolph, concur-
ring in the decision, acknowledged the generalized nature of Public
Citizen's complaint. He noted that "it is difficult to see how the act
of proposing legislation could generate direct effects on [interest
groups], or anyone else for that matter.' 8 4 In other words, the
court implies that Public Citizen raised a complaint better suited to
the political branches. However, the court remained true to the
Lujan J185 and the Foundation'16 precedents and only reviewed
for a final agency action.
CONCLUSION
As the discussion of the Public Citizen case indicates, standing
is a confusing and difficult issue to apply. When the court's
178 PC IIA, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994).
179 PC IIA, 5 F.3d at 550.
"o Id. at 551.
181 Id. at 550.
182 Id. ("Because we conclude that [the trade agreement] is not 'final agency
action' under the APA, we reverse the decision of the district court and express
no view on the government's other contentions.").
183 Id.; id. at 553-54 (Randolph, C.J., concurring).
184 Id. at 553.
185 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
186 Foundation on Economic Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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primary focus is directed to the issue raised by the interest group,
prior to verifying the existence of a valid injury in fact, it only
encourages additional litigation. The Public Citizen case is a prime
example. Interest groups will continually return to court seeking the
elusive final agency action regardless of whether their claim is
actually proper for judicial resolution.
The Supreme Court needs to articulate a clear process for the
environmental standing inquiry under NEPA and APA review. The
Court's initial focus should be on the injury in fact test. This focus
will expose Public Citizen type informational injury claims as
inherently generalized grievances and not suitable for judicial
review. The Court, therefore, needs to supply a definitive answer
on informational injury as a sufficient injury to confer standing
under Article III. A benefit to be gained by these answers will be
less use of the court's valuable resources by interest group's merely
raising political policy grievances out of a mere special interest.
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